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Despite the large number of studies on synchronization, the hypothesis that interactions bear a
cost for involved individuals has been considered seldom. The introduction of costly interactions
leads, instead, to the formulation of a dichotomous scenario in which an individual may decide to
cooperate and pay the cost in order to get synchronized with the rest of the population. Alterna-
tively, the same individual can decide to free ride, without incurring in any cost, waiting that others
get synchronized to her state. The emergence of synchronization may thus be seen as the byproduct
of an evolutionary game in which individuals decide their behavior according to the benefit/cost
ratio they accrue in the past. We study the onset of cooperation/synchronization in networked
populations of Kuramoto oscillators and report how topology is essential in order for cooperation
to thrive. We display also how different classes of topology foster differently synchronization both
at a microscopic and macroscopic level.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 05.45.Xt, 02.50.Le
The simultaneous occurrence of events known as syn-
chronization constitutes one of the most fascinating phe-
nomenon ever studied. Synchronization has, in fact, been
observed in systems of different nature from power grids,
to biological and chemical environments just to name a
few [1–4]. If the system is composed of many units, the
pattern of interactions among them plays a cornerstone
role in the establishment of the conditions under which
the onset of synchronization occurs [5, 6]. Initially, sci-
entists have studied such onset by encoding interactions
as either a mean-field or a regular lattice [1, 4]. However,
interactions in real systems are better described as com-
plex networks [7] and, therefore, it is important to pursue
the study of synchronization within such paradigm [5].
Despite the abundance of studies regarding the emer-
gence of synchronization in networked populations of dy-
namical units, a key aspect has been neglected thus far:
the existence of a cost associated to the interactions re-
sponsible for the update of the state of each dynamical
unit. Yet, it seems reasonable to assume that the intro-
duction of a cost affects the dynamics. With the present
Letter we sought to highlight what happens to the syn-
chronization phenomena when interactions between indi-
viduals are regulated by an evolutionary non-cooperative
game. More specifically, we are interested in studying the
emergence of synchronization in systems where agents
can decide whether to interact – or not – with their neigh-
bors by evaluating the cost sustained to alter their own
state and the benefit received by getting more synchro-
nized with the rest of the neighborhood. Decision pro-
cesses based on the evaluation of a payoff constitute the
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heart of evolutionary game theory [8, 9]. Thus, a coevo-
lutionary approach based on synchronization and evolu-
tionary game theory is the natural frameset to study this
kind of problem. We are interested in assessing under
which conditions the will of getting synchronized (i.e.
cooperating) affects the attainment of a global synchro-
nized state. In addition, since the topology of interac-
tions plays a role of paramount importance for the onset
of a collective behavior [5, 10, 11], we also want to study
the nexus between different topologies and the thriving
of cooperation/synchronization.
In the proposed model we study the emergence of syn-
chronization and cooperation in networked populations
of coupled Kuramoto oscillators [6, 12–14]. Each node
corresponds to a different agent/oscillator called to face a
dilemma, named the Evolutionary Kuramoto’s Dilemma
(EKD), whenever it must decide the strategy to adopt in
the future. As we will show, the structure of interactions
affects dramatically the conditions under which coopera-
tion and synchronization thrive. Specifically, we observe
the onset of a new transition from the synchronized to
incoherent state when either the coupling strength or the
relative cost become too elevate. Moreover, the location
of the transition non-trivially depends on the topology of
the interaction structure.
Let us consider a graph G(N, 〈k〉) of N nodes and aver-
age degree 〈k〉. Each node, l, represents a dynamical unit
and its state is characterized by its strategy sl, phase θl,
and natural frequency ωl. The strategy is equal to sl = 1
(sl = 0) if the agent is a cooperator (defector) and shapes
the interaction pattern of the agent. The evolution of the
phase is governed by a slightly modified version of the
ar
X
iv
:1
60
7.
03
18
6v
4 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  5
 Se
p 2
01
7
2Kuramoto model [12–14] given by:
θ˙l = ωl + sl λ
N∑
j=1
alj sin(θj − θl) , (1)
where λ is the coupling strength, and alj are the elements
of the adjacency matrix A of G. Initially, both θ and ω
are uniformly distributed over the interval [−pi, pi]. To
gauge the global synchronization level of the system, we
use the Kuramoto order parameter rG [12, 13], given by:
rG e
iΨ =
1
N
N∑
j=1
eiθj with rG ∈ [0, 1] , (2)
where i is the imaginary unit and Ψ is the average phase
of the system. When rG = 0 the system is in the inco-
herent state where all the oscillators have distinct phases.
Conversely, rG = 1 denotes a fully coherent (i.e. synchro-
nized) state where all the oscillators have the same phase.
Apart from the global order parameter, it is possible to
define a local measure, rl, which only accounts for the
level of synchronization of a given node with respect to
its neighbors. This, in turns, stems from the general case
of Eq. (2), which for a pair of nodes l and m is:
rlm e
i(θl+θm)/2 =
eiθl + eiθm
2
. (3)
Hence, for a node l, the local order parameter, rl, is:
rl =
∑N
m=1 alm rlm∑N
m=1 alm
, (4)
Consequently, we can define its average over all the nodes
as rL =
1
N
∑
l rl.
The evolution of the strategy of a given node/player l
depends on the evaluation of the payoff accumulated dur-
ing one discrete step of synchronization dynamics. The
payoff is given by the difference between the benefit bl
and the cost cl, that the player attains. The former ac-
counts how much an oscillator has converged towards be-
ing synchronized with its neighbors and is equal to the
local order parameter rl, given by Eq. (4). The latter is
given by the absolute value of the angular acceleration,
i.e. :
cl = ∆θ˙l ≡
∣∣∣θ˙l(t)− θ˙l(t− )∣∣∣ , (5)
where  = 0.01 is the discrete step used to compute
the synchronization dynamics given by Eq. (1) with the
Runge-Kutta method. The absolute value is required to
ensure that cl is always semidefinite positive. Finally, the
payoff of a node is defined as:
Πl = rl − α cl
2pi
. (6)
Here the cost has been divided by 2pi to make it commen-
surable with the benefit. Furthermore, we modulate the
role of the cost by multiplying it for a scalar α named rel-
ative cost. The payoff function is designed in a way such
that the benefit complies with the assumption that nodes
with larger degree could accumulate a higher payoff, and
also that low levels of synchronization may lead to nega-
tive payoffs. Once the players accumulate their payoffs,
they decide the strategy to adopt in the next time step
by means of the so-called Fermi rule [9, 11, 15]. In such
rule, the focal player l randomly selects one of its neigh-
bors, m, and adopts its strategy with a probability given
by:
P (sl ← sm) = 1
1 + e−β(Πm−Πl)
, (7)
where β accounts for the “irrationality” of the players.
Without loss of generality, we use β = 1 throughout this
study. We also point out that our results are qualitatively
in agreement with those using other update rules [11],
see Supplementary Information (SI), Sec. VI. We con-
sider networks with N = 1000 and 〈k〉 = 6. As initial
condition, we set half of the population made of coopera-
tors. After each synchronization step, agents accumulate
their payoffs and synchronously update their strategies
according to Eq. (7). We repeat these steps until the
system reaches the stationary state.
To summarize, a cooperator always accepts to interact
with its neighbors trying to reach mutual synchroniza-
tion by paying the cost associated with such interactions.
A defector, instead, refuses to interact with its neigh-
bors and does not pay any cost. Given this scenario, we
can consider a well-mixed population initially composed
by (N − 1) cooperators plus a single defector. From an
evolutionary point of view, the defector is highly advan-
taged obtaining, on average, the same benefit of all other
members (getting synchronized) without incurring any
cost. Thus, the defector has a payoff always greater than
a cooperator, despite cooperating would imply a higher
benefit for the entire population. Hence, the system evo-
lutionarily undergoes a transition to complete defection
which in the jargon of evolutionary game theory is called
“the tragedy of the commons” [8, 16].
As we have seen, the well-mixed scenario leads to the
emergence of a fully defection and incoherent state. On
the other hand, it has been reckoned that the struc-
ture of interactions is one of the mechanisms fostering
the emergence of both cooperation and synchronization
[17, 18]. In the light of that, we can sought if net-
worked interactions may overcome the temptation to de-
fect and, in turns, lead to the emergence of a coherent
state. It is therefore interesting to study under which
circumstances networked populations allow synchroniza-
tion to thrive. To explore such scenario, we choose three
different network topologies, namely; Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER)
random graphs, Random Geometric Graphs (RGG) and
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free networks [7, 19–21].
We begin the study of our toy model by looking at its
global behaviour. In Fig. 1 we display both the average
level of cooperation, 〈C〉 (top), and the global order pa-
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FIG. 1. (color online) Emergence of cooperation/synchronization at global scale. The top (bottom) row illustrates the average
level of cooperation (synchronization) 〈C〉 (〈rG〉) as a function of the coupling λ and relative cost α. Each column corresponds
to a different topology, namely: ER, RGG and BA. Results are averages over 50 different realizations.
rameter, 〈rG〉 (bottom), as a function of the relative cost
α and coupling strength λ. At first glance, we notice a
strong correlation between the onsets of cooperation and
synchronization due to the intertwining among these dy-
namics. For example, for low and intermediate values of
α, the system displays a transition from an incoherent
state to a fully coherent one when the coupling exceeds
a critical value. It is worth mentioning that such transi-
tion takes place at couplings slightly above the expected
ones given by λtheoc = λ
MF
c
〈k〉
〈k2〉 , where λ
MF
c is the criti-
cal value of the coupling in the mean field case [17]. For
each topology, we display λtheoc as an horizontal dashed
line. For low relative costs, as the coupling increases, we
observe the appearance of a second spontaneous transi-
tion from a coherent state to an incoherent one. The
reason behind such loss of synchronization is the increas-
ing burden associated with the variation of the angular
speed, i.e. the cost, with respect to the benefit associ-
ated to the increase of synchronization. Such transition
is observed exclusively for small to intermediate values
of α and the region where synchronization takes place
shrinks as α increases. Ultimately, for high values of α
synchronization never occurs independently on the cou-
pling strength and on the considered topology. In the
case of homogeneous networks, following the method in-
troduced by Ohtsuki et al. [22] (see SI, Sec. II), we can
analytically perimeter the region of the parameter space
inside which a single defector is able to invade a pop-
ulation of cooperators. Such region is delimited by the
curved dashed line in the ER and RGG panels. In anal-
ogy with other studies on coevolutionary dynamics [23],
the results shown in Fig. 1 tell us that BA networks do
not promote synchronization and cooperation more than
ER random graphs; in spite of what reported previously
for each dynamics [5, 17, 24, 25]. Yet, RGG panels point
towards the existence of additional mechanisms associ-
ated with spatial correlations and the presence of commu-
nity structure in order to converge to more cooperative
outcomes (see SI, Sec. IV).
To shed light on such discrepancy, in Fig. 2 we present
a microscopic analysis by measuring 〈rL〉kσ for different
connectivity classes, kσ, and for three scenarios of rela-
tive cost. More precisely, we consider the following cases:
α = 10−3, 10−1.4, 1.0, to account for cheap, intermediate
and expensive interactions, respectively. Darker solid
lines account for low degree nodes while brighter lines
account for highly connected ones. The vertical dashed
lines delimit the region where synchronization theoreti-
cally emerges (dark red) and vanishes (cyan). The hori-
zontal line, instead, accounts for the analytical value that
rL assumes when two nodes are randomly selected in a
well-mixed population (see SI, Sec. I) accounting for a
scenario where no synchronization is observed. A closer
inspection to Fig. 2 reveals a set of intriguing features.
The first is that in BA networks – and to large extent
also in ER ones – nodes tend to attain synchronization
all together, in accordance with [17], but then they lose it
in a hierarchical order, instead. This is not the case for
the RGG where a hierarchy exists in both transitions,
whose quantitative analysis deserves further investiga-
tion. Moreover, there is a value of λ for which the hi-
erarchy gets inverted meaning that nodes placed at the
core of communities tend to act as condensation nuclei
exerting a positive feedback for the formation of coopera-
tive clusters, but are also burdened with higher costs and
therefore lose synchronization sooner (see SI, Sec. IV).
410-210-1 100 101 102 103
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
〈 r L〉
k
ER
10-210-1 100 101 102 103
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
RGG
10-210-1 100 101 102 103
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
BA
10-210-1 100 101 102 103
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
〈 r L〉
k
10-210-1 100 101 102 103
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
10-210-1 100 101 102 103
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
10-210-1 100 101 102 103
λ
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
〈 r L〉
k
k1
k2
k3
k4
10-210-1 100 101 102 103
λ
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0 k1
k2
k3
k4
10-210-1 100 101 102 103
λ
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0 k1
k2
k3
k4
k5
k6
k7
FIG. 2. (color online) Emergence of cooperation/synchronization at microscopic scale. Each plot displays the average local
Kuramoto parameter for different degree classes 〈rL〉kσ as a function of the coupling λ and for the three studied topologies
(ER, RGG, BA). Colors refer to different degree classes: kσ∈{k1, . . . , k4 ⇐⇒ [1, 3], [4, 7], [8, 10], [11,∞]} for both ER and RGG,
and kσ∈{k1, . . . , k7 ⇐⇒ [1, 5], [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 40], [41, 55], [56, 80], [81,∞]} for BA. Each row corresponds to a different value
of α: top row, α = 10−3, middle row, α = 10−1.4, and bottom row, α = 1.0. Results are averages over 50 different realizations.
The loss of synchronization is particularly strong in BA
networks where is usually accompanied by a drop of rL
below the average value in the cheap interactions regime.
The intermediate cost regime presents a similar picture
but where the second transition shrinks. Finally, in the
high cost regime we observe the complete absence of syn-
chronization also at a local level. The average coopera-
tion level essentially follows the same trend of the local
synchronization (see SI, Sec. III). We also performed sim-
ulations to test the robustness of our results for different
initial conditions, letting the system synchronizing for τ
steps before starting the coevolutionary process and a
higher initial fraction of cooperators (see SI, Sec. V).
In conclusion, by accounting for the existence of a
cost associated to synchronization interactions, we have
built a coevolutionary toy model based on the inter-
twining of synchronization and evolutionary game theory.
The resulting dilemma has been named the Evolutionary
Kuramoto’s Dilemma (EKD). Network reciprocity has
proven itself as a valuable catalyzer of both the survival
of cooperation and synchronization, and the effects of
accounting for the cost of interaction in networked pop-
ulations are twofolds. On one hand, high values of the
coupling result in the desynchronization of the system,
which has been previously observed only in higher or-
der models like the Ro¨ssler [26]. The other result is the
appearance of a hierarchy in the degree of nodes attain-
ing/losing synchronization, which depends on the topol-
ogy in a non-trivial manner. Our numerical results have
been performed for relatively small system size, although
analogous chimera states can emerge also on larger RGG
and lattice topologies [27, 28]. Considering more realistic
patterns, like spatial proximity and heterogeneous ones,
sheds some light on such dependence and paves the way
to further investigations. Finally, the model presented
here – apart from looking at synchronization under a dif-
ferent perspective – can be used to tackle a wide range of
problems, leveraging the interplay between coupling, cost
and topology to drive the system towards a coherent or
incoherent state. For example, the relation between co-
operation and synchronization has been explored in the
context of Social and Cognitive/Behavioral Sciences. In
the former, previous studies pointed at assessing whether
the execution of coordinated/synchronized actions may
5foster the onset of cooperation (military drills are an ex-
ample of such situations) [29–31]. In the latter, instead,
studies aimed at understanding how the individual be-
havioural plasticity – i.e. the will of individuals to dis-
regard their individual preferences – could be altered to
improve the synchronization [32–36]. An even more ap-
pealing application is represented by the so-called “social
insects” (ants, bees, fireflies, etc.) whose synchronized
(or not) behaviour – i.e. the flashing of fireflies and Lep-
tothorax acervorum ants activity cycle to cite a few –
can be explained in terms of natural selection [37–41].
Lastly, a modified version of the Kuramoto model has
been used also to study the attainment of consensus in
opinion dynamics [42–44].
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1Supplemental Information:
Coevolution of synchronization and cooperation in costly networked interactions
I. AVERAGE PAIRWISE ORDER PARAMETER
Considering a population of N Kuramoto’s phase oscillators, being θl and θm the phases of two randomly selected
elements l and m. Without loss of generality, we can rotate the reference system by an angle −θl such that θ′l = 0
and θ′m = θm−θl = θ. Since θ is uniformly distributed over [−pi, pi]; we can compute the average value of the pairwise
order parameter, rlm, between l and m, given by Eq. (3) in the main text as:
rlm =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
∥∥1 + eiθ∥∥
2
dθ =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
‖1 + cos θ + i sin θ‖
2
dθ =
=
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
√
[1 + cos θ]2 + sin2 θ
2
dθ =
4
2pi
=
2
pi
∼ 0.6366 .
(S1)
II. ESTIMATION OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH COOPERATION CAN EMERGE
The standard procedure to determine the conditions under which cooperation may thrive is to compute the difference
of payoffs between a cooperator and a defector. If such difference is positive, the cooperator will be evolutionary
advantaged with respect to the defector. Remembering that the payoff of a node l is given by:
Πl = rl − α cl
2pi
. (S2)
Let us consider a system of two oscillators l and m having θl and θm as phase and θ˙l and θ˙m as frequency, respectively.
We want to calculate the benefit bC (bD), i.e. rlm, when node l is a cooperator (defector) and node m is a defector.
This means that node m does not change its frequency θ˙m, while node l adjusts θl when behaves as a cooperator
interacting with m. As commented in Sec. I, we consider θm = 0. For simplicity, we put x = θl. When both oscillators
are defectors, we have:
bD = rlm =
∥∥1 + eix∥∥
2
=
‖1 + cos(x) + i sin(x)‖
2
=
=
√
[1 + cos(x)]2 + sin2(x)
2
=
√
2[1 + cos(x)]
2
=
√
1 + cos(x)
2
.
(S3)
According to the Kuramoto’s model, if l is a cooperator it will change its phase from θl(t) to θl(t+ ε). To highlight
the role of the interactions in the process of accumulation of the payoff, we impose that the reference system turns at
the same speed of l. Therefore, we can set ωl = 0 and write:
θl(t+ ε) = θl(t) + ελ sin(θm(t)− θl(t)) .
where ε represents the discrete time step size and λ the coupling strength. Since θm = 0, we obtain:
θl(t+ ε) = θl(t) + ελ sin(−θl(t)) = x− ελ sin(x) .
Consequently:
bC = rlm =
∥∥1 + ei[x−ελ sin(x)]∥∥
2
=
√
1 + cos(x− ελ sin(x))
2
. (S4)
The difference in benefit ∆b = bC − bD gives the benefit increase b that node m receives from node l when the
latter cooperates. The cost, c, in which node l incurs when cooperating is:
c =
α
∣∣∣θ˙l(t+ ε)− θ˙l(t)∣∣∣
2pi
=
α |ωl + ελ sin(x)− ωl|
2pi
=
α |ελ sin(x)|
2pi
.
2As for Sec. I, we consider a mean-field scenario assuming that θm = 0 and θl =
pi
2 . Thus, we have:
bC =
√√√√√[1 + cos(pi2 − ελ sin pi2)
]
2
=
√√√√1 + cos(pi
2
− ελ
)
2
=
√
1 + sin (ελ)
2
,
bD =
√√√√1 + cos pi2
2
=
√
2
2
.
Therefore:
b = ∆b = bC − bD =
√
1 + sin(ελ)
2
−
√
2
2
=
√
2 + 2 sin(ελ)−√2
2
,
c =
α
∣∣∣ελ sin pi
2
∣∣∣
2pi
=
α |ελ|
2pi
=
αελ
2pi
.
Applying the method introduced by Ohtsuki et al. [22] in the case of a homogeneous network with N nodes and
average degree k, we find that cooperators have a fixation probability greater than 1/N , and defectors have a fixation
probability less than 1/N , if:
b/c > k√
2 + 2 sin(ελ)−√2
αελ
pi > k√
2 + 2 sin(ελ)−√2
ελk
pi > α .
The last inequality represents the mean-field condition in which cooperation can evolve and it is the curved line
plotted in Fig. 1 of the main text. We did not plot these condition for heterogeneous networks, as the BA scale free
topology, since they could not be considered accurate enough.
3III. MICROSCOPIC ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGY
In Fig. S1 we display the strategy of the nodes in the stationary state as a function of the coupling λ for the
three cost regimes of the main manuscript. In contrast with Fig. 2, we do not observe any difference associated to
the degree. Such absence can be explained by the fact that these results are drawn in the stationary state where
the population is generally formed by agents with the same strategy. As we will comment in the next section, there
could be cases in which the stationary state may correspond to a population not fully made by agents with the same
strategy. However, since the results displayed in Fig. S1 are averaged over 50 different realizations, those “anomalies”
are smoothed away by averaging over the ensemble of realizations.
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FIG. S1. Average strategy 〈s〉 as a function of the coupling λ for all the considered topologies. For each topology, we display
three values of relative cost α, namely: 10−3, 10−1.4 and 100. Results are averaged over 50 different realizations.
4IV. EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN RANDOM GEOMETRIC GRAPHS
We want to display the evolution of cooperation in the case of a RGG topology. In Figs. S2 – S4 we display in
color code the phase θ, and angular speed θ˙ for all the N nodes in the system at four different instants in time t.
Each figure refers to λ = 100 and a different relative cost regime, namely: cheap (S2, α = 10−3), intermediate (S3,
α = 10−0.8) and expensive (S4, α = 10−0.5), respectively. In the same pictures we display also the global and local
levels of synchronization together with the fraction of cooperators in the population.
In the cheap regime, Fig. S2, from t = 2000 onwards, the system is almost fully made of cooperators. Given so,
one may conclude that the global synchronization level rG should also converge to one, but, this is not the case.
The spatial structure of the interactions bolsters the formation of small highly synchronized groups – also confirmed
by the value of rL – that do not get synchronized with each other. Thus, the system ends in a phase-locked state
corroborated by the fact that θ˙ ∼ 0 for all oscillators (middle panel of Fig. S2). This value falls exactly at the middle
of the range [−pi, pi] which is the range used to initialize both θ and θ˙.
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FIG. S2. Evolution in time and space of cooperation and synchronization in the cheap regime (λ = 100, α = 10−3). The nodes
are represented as circles (squares) if they are cooperators (defectors). The color encodes the phase θ (top row) and angular
speed θ˙ (middle) using the HSB scale. From left to right, each panel corresponds to time t equals to 0, 200, 2000 and 5000
steps respectively. The nodes are placed on a torus (boundaries connections are not displayed).
The intermediate regime, Fig. S3, shows the emergence, almost since the very beginning, of a cluster of defectors –
represented as squared nodes – able to resist the invasion of cooperators, and causing the decrease of the synchroniza-
tion level around its periphery. Such destructive effect is enough to prejudicate completely the global synchronization
which, in fact, is well approximated by an incoherent state (rG ' 0).
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FIG. S3. Evolution in time and space of cooperation and synchronization in the intermediate regime: λ = 100, α = 10−0.8. All
the other settings are the same as Fig. S2.
The expensive cost regime picture, Fig. S4, portraits the utter defeat of cooperation. The interactions are, indeed,
so expensive that cooperators connected with defectors immediately change their strategy, paving the way to the
invasion of defectors. In this scenario, cooperation dies out almost immediately (not shown) blasting away any chance
of attaining synchronization.
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FIG. S4. Evolution in time and space of cooperation and synchronization in the expensive regime: λ = 100, α = 10−0.5. All
the other settings are the same as Fig. S2.
7V. RESULTS FOR OTHER INITIAL CONDITIONS
To assess the robustness of the transition from the coherent to incoherent state, we alter the time at which nodes
update their strategies for the first time. More specifically, the system evolves for a number of steps τ after which
agents are allowed to update their strategy. The introduction of a transient time allows to prove if the emergence of
a completely defective state is due to the fact that nodes are initially poorly synchronized and therefore accumulate
little payoffs paving the way for the invasion of defectors. By letting the nodes synchronize for an amount of time
τ , we reduce such possibility. In Fig. S5 we plot the global 〈RG〉 and local 〈RL〉 order parameters as a function of
the coupling λ in the cheapest regime (α = 0.001) for ER networks. As we can notice, changing the value of the
first iteration at which update of strategies takes place does not produce any qualitative modification in the overall
behavior of the system compared to the case where the update of the strategy takes place from the very beginning.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
〈 R G〉
τ = 0
τ = 25
τ = 100
10-2 10-1 100 101 102 103 104 105
λ
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
〈 R L〉
FIG. S5. Global 〈RG〉 (top) and local 〈RL〉 (bottom) synchronization level as a function of the coupling λ for different times of
first strategy update τ . All results consider a relative cost α = 0.001 and ER topology. Results are averaged over 50 different
realizations.
Figure S6 shows the same analysis of Fig. 1 for a different initial fraction of cooperators (99%). We observe an
overall higher level of cooperation, also in regions in which cooperation was not previously observed and filling entirely
the analytical region. As a byproduct, synchronization gets also enhanced but albeit we have cooperation also for
couplings smaller than the critical one we cannot reach a synchronized state.
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FIG. S6. Emergence of cooperation/synchronization at global scale for an initial population with 99% of cooperators. The
top (bottom) row illustrates the average level of cooperation (synchronization) 〈C〉 (〈rG〉) as a function of the coupling λ and
relative cost α. Each column corresponds to a different topology, namely: ER, RGG and BA. Results are averages over 50
different realizations.
VI. OTHER UPDATE RULES
In this section we study the effects of using update strategies other than the synchronous Fermi rule (Eq. (7))
adopted throughout the main text. In Figs. S7 and S8, we present the same type of plots of Fig. 1 but for the case
of the asynchronous Fermi (AF) rule first, and synchronous Unconditional Imitation (UI) then.
In many biological contexts, the assumption that decisions are made in synchrony is unrealistic. Therefore, we relax
such hypothesis allowing agents to change their behavior in a asynchronous way, i.e. at each time step only a single
randomly chosen agent updates her strategy. Nevertheless, the overall levels of cooperation, 〈C〉, and global synchro-
nization, 〈rG〉, attained in all three network topologies remain pretty the same. We are thus able to conclude that
the order of strategy updates seems to not play a significative role in the emergence of cooperation/synchronization.
In Fig. S8 we explore the possibility to use a deterministic update rule. According to the UI rule, in fact, an agent
i updates her strategy si by copying the one of her neighbor, j, having the highest payoff among all the neighbors of
i, Ni if and only if such payoff is higher than her own. Thus:
si(t+ 1) =

si(t) if Πi ≥ max
l∈Ni
Πl ,
sj(t) with j | Πj = max
l∈Ni
Πl otherwise.
(S5)
Regardless of the topology, the levels of cooperation and synchronization attained with UI are higher than in the
Fermi rule. The reason of such enhancement is due to the propensity of UI to promote more cooperation as reported
in [11]. However, despite the broader area where synchronization occurs, the qualitative behavior of the dynamics
remains the same and we still observe the transition from coherence to incoherence as we increase either the coupling
λ, the cost α or both.
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FIG. S7. Emergence of cooperation/synchronization at global scale for the asynchronous Fermi update rule. The top (bottom)
row illustrates the average level of cooperation (synchronization) 〈C〉 (〈rG〉) as a function of the coupling λ and relative cost α.
Each column corresponds to a different topology, namely: ER, RGG and BA. Results are averages over 50 different realizations.
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FIG. S8. Emergence of cooperation/synchronization at global scale for the synchronous Unconditional Imitation update rule.
All the other settings are the same as in Fig. S7.
